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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The names of all parties to the proceedings in the lower 
court are set forth in the caption of the case on appeal. 
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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether there is governmental immunity for plaintiff 
James D. Ericksen's claim against Salt Lake City and Salt Lake 
Airport Authority. The district court's statutory interpretation 
is reviewed for correctness by this Court with no particular 
deference to the conclusion of the trial court. State v. Rio 
Vista Oil, Limited, 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990). 
2. Whether Salt Lake City is entitled to express indemnity 
from Projects Unlimited under the written contract between them. 
The district courts conclusions of law are reviewed de novo by 
this Court. State v. Rio Vista Oil, Limited, 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 
1990). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4) (1990 Amend.), formerly § 63-
30-10(1) (d) , which preserves governmental immunity "if the injury 
arises out of . . . a failure to make an inspection or by making 
an inadequate or negligent inspection." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff James D. Ericksen was injured in a fall from a 
ladder on March 5, 1987, while employed by Projects Unlimited, 
Inc., general contractor for the construction of a maintenance 
building for Salt Lake City Corporation at the Salt Lake 
International Airport. He alleged that the City inspector at the 
Airport negligently caused the ladder to fall while inspecting 
the construction. 
Salt Lake City and its Airport Authority appeal from the 
trial court's failure to dismiss them on the ground that 
Ericksen7s claim for bodily injury arose by reason of City 
Inspector Millard Rice "making an inadequate or negligent 
inspection" of property undetr Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (d) 
(1965) . 
Salt Lake City also appeals from the trial court's denial of 
contractual indemnity to Salt Lake City against Projects 
Unlimited. 
Statement of Facts 
1. The accident to James Ericksen occurred when Salt Lake 
City Construction Inspector, Millard Rice, during the course of 
an inspection on behalf of Salt Lake City, inadvertently raised 
an electric overhead door against which was resting a ladder on 
which Ericksen was working, dislodging the ladder and causing 
Ericksen to fall several feet to the cement floor and sustain a 
lower back injury. (R. 289 pp. 10-11). 
2. After the circumstances were identified through 
depositions of Mr. Ericksen and Mr. Rice, Salt Lake City moved 
for summary judgment on the ground that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(1)(d) specifically did not waive governmental immunity for 
injury arising by reason of making a negligent inspection of any 
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property. The trial court denied that motion. (R. 287, 288, 55-
56) . 
3. Salt Lake City then joined the general contractor, 
Projects Unlimited, Inc., as a third-party defendant for 
indemnity under the written construction contract between 
Projects Unlimited and Salt Lake City which required Projects 
Unlimited to indemnify the City from all claims, including claims 
by employees of the parties, which may arise out of the work or 
other activity related in any way to the project by the 
contractor. (R. 62-69) . 
4. After discovery, Salt Lake City and Projects Unlimited 
each moved for summary judgment against the other based on the 
written contract. The court granted Projects Unlimited's motion 
and denied Salt Lake City's motion, dismissing Salt Lake City's 
third-party complaint in full on the ground that the contract 
language did not require Projects Unlimited to indemnify Salt 
Lake City for Salt Lake City's negligence, and Mr. Ericksen would 
be allowed to recover against Salt Lake City only for Salt Lake 
City's negligence and not for Projects Unlimited's negligence, so 
there was no need for contractual indemnity to Salt Lake City for 
the negligence of Projects Unlimited. (R. 248-51). 
5. The action went to jury trial on March 5-7, 1991, 
resulting in a verdict that Ericksen was 10% negligent, Salt Lake 
City was 50% negligent, and Projects Unlimited was 40% negligent 
in causing the accident. Total damages were assessed of 
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$186,200. At trial, the court denied Salt Lake City's request to 
instruct the jury on governmental immunity and to present the 
governmental immunity issue to the jury on the special verdict. 
(R. 195-199, 289 pp. 38-41). 
6. Based on the jury verdict, the court entered judgment 
against Salt Lake City for 50% of the damages, plus costs and 
interest on the special damages. This appeal followed. (R. 266-
70) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY: By statutory mandate, the operation 
of the Salt Lake Airport is a governmental activity protected 
from tort liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
(Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-1524, formerly § 2-5-24). The Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act preserves immunity where an injury 
arises by reason of making a negligent inspection of property 
(Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(4), formerly § 63-30-10(1)(d)). The 
Governmental Immunity Act should be applied in this instance to 
free government inspectors from the threat of tort liability 
arising from the inspection activity. The purpose of the statute 
is to protect government inspections which benefit all citizens 
who pay for or use public goods and services. Sovereign immunity 
should not be taken away from the inspection process where the 
statute clearly extends to inspections. 
CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY: The construction contractor Ericksen 
was working for, Projects Unlimited, contracted with the City to 
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protect it against all claims, including claims by its employees, 
arising out of the contractor's work on the project. This 
comprehensive agreement requires Projects Unlimited to indemnify 
the City for the damages of Projects Unlimited's employee James 
Ericksen who was injured in the course of Projects Unlimited's 
work under the contract (Article 15 of "Agreement11 dated April 9, 
1986, R. 122). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Court should reverse the denial of summary judgment to 
Salt Lake City and Salt Lake Airport Authority against Ericksen. 
The Court should also reverse the summary judgment in favor of 
Projects Unlimited and the denial of Salt Lake City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Projects Unlimited, and remand to the 
district court for entry of judgment for litigation expenses 
against Projects Unlimited. 
Ericksen has cross-appealed and filed a Docketing Statement 
asserting that the verdict should not be reduced by the 40% 
negligence of Projects Unlimited. If Ericksen prevails on this 
argument, Salt Lake City should be awarded indemnity against 
Projects Unlimited for the 40% negligence of Projects Unlimited 




GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROHIBITS ERICKSEN'S 
ACTION AGAINST SALT LAKE CITY AND SALT LAKE 
AIRPORT AUTHORITY. 
By statutory mandate in Utah, the functions and operations 
of the Salt Lake Airport are* governmental activities protected 
from tort liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
The "Utah Public Airport Authority Act", Utah Code Ann. 
§ 2-5-1 et seq. provides at 2-5-24: 
2-5-24. Governmental capacity of authority. 
Each authority created under this Act is 
declared to be performing public functions 
and operating in a governmental capacity and 
has all powers prescribed in this Act. 
The 1990 Amendment renumbered this section as § 17A-2-1524 and 
substituted "part" for "Act". 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act restates the common law 
of sovereign immunity from tort liability for governmental 
functions: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are 
immune from suit for any injury which 
results from the exercise of a governmental 
function, . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3. 
This Court has held repeatedly that this section indicates 
an intention that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act be strictly 
applied to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it only as 
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clearly expressed in the Act. Holt v. Utah State Road 
Commission, 511 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973); Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 
242 (Utah 1976). 
There is no waiver of governmental immunity in this case 
where plaintiff claims his injury arose by reason of the 
governmental employee making a negligent inspection. The Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act waives immunity for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment, except for certain areas in which 
immunity is not waived, including injury which "(d) arises out of 
a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection of any property;". Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10(1)(d). 
This section means there is governmental immunity for injury 
arising by reason of making a negligent inspection of any 
property. 
The facts of the accident through deposition testimony and 
trial testimony are as follows: 
1. Mr. Millard Rice, 59 years old at the time, had been a 
construction inspector at the Salt Lake Airport for ten years as 
an employee of Salt Lake City. (R. 287 pp. 4-5). 
2. Mr. Rice has an office at the Airport and his job is to 
go around to the different construction projects at the Airport 
and inspect them. (R. 287 pp. 6-7) . 
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3. His job is to see that construction contractors do 
their work for the Airport according to the plans and specifi-
cations. (R. 287 p. 9 lines 4-5; R. 289 p. 18). 
4. Mr. Rice inspects whatever construction work is being 
done, and if there is something that is not done according to the 
plans and specifications, he reports to the superintendent of the 
general contractor, so corrections can be made. (R. 287 p. 13 
lines 10-22). 
5. On March 5, 1987, Mr. Rice was inspecting the 
construction of a maintenance facility building at the Airport. 
(R. 287 p. 7 lines 21-23). 
6. The general contractor was Projects Unlimited, and 
plaintiff James Ericksen was an employee of Projects Unlimited. 
(R. 287 p. 10 line 2-5; p. 13 lines 7-9). 
7. Mr. Rice was walking around the construction project 
with the owner of Projects Unlimited and the superintendent of 
Projects Unlimited, in the course of inspecting the various 
details of construction on a punch list. (R. 287 p. 16 lines 16-
22; p. 17 lines 19-24). 
8. The maintenance facility building has rows of large 
garage-type overhead doors located one after another, fourteen on 
each side, with the electric control button for each door mounted 
on the wall between each door and the next door. Each control 
panel would open and close the door directly to the left. (R. 
287 p. 18 lines 13-15; p. 30 lines 10-18; R. 289 p. 6). 
8 
9. At the time of the accident, Mr. Rice and the two men 
from Projects Unlimited had reached the item on the inspection 
list which pertained to the rubber seal which ran along the 
bottom of each door. Mr. Rice was inspecting this rubber seal on 
one of the doors, and to do so he pushed the electric control 
button to open the door slightly, so he could more accurately 
inspect the rubber seal at the bottom of the door. (R. 287 p. 17 
line 19 to p. 18 line 10). 
10. Mr. Rice was inspecting the door directly to his right, 
and pushed the control button expecting that door to open. 
However, that particular control operated the door to his left, 
which started to open, dislodging a ladder on which James 
Ericksen was working, and Mr. Ericksen fell a few feet to the 
floor. (R. 287 p. 18 lines 7-10; p. 23 lines 6-14). 
11. James Ericksen, age 25, and employed by Projects 
Unlimited, was on the ladder painting a sprinkler pipe on orders 
from his supervisor at Projects Unlimited. (R. 288 p. 4; p. 26, 
line 23 to p. 27 line 8; R. 289 p. 25-26). 
12. The work James Ericksen was performing at the time of 
the accident in painting a small piece of sprinkler pipe was also 
work resulting from the inspection of punch list items. (R. 287 
p. 13 line 23 to p. 15 line 22; R. 288 p. 27 lines 3-4). 
13. After he fell, Mr. Ericksen was x-rayed and released at 
Pioneer Valley Hospital. (R. 288 p. 9 lines 13-19). He later 
developed lower back pain symptoms for which he is receiving 
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worker's compensation benefits and for which he claims damages in 
this lawsuit. (R. 288 p. 21 to p. 22 line 15). 
The claims directed against Salt Lake City and Salt Lake 
Airport Authority are that Ericksen's injury arose from 
negligence of inspector Millard Rice in making his inspection of 
the rubber seal along the bottom of the door. This is a claim 
protected by governmental immunity. 
POINT II. 
IF PLAINTIFF'S INJURY AROSE BY REASON OF 
MILLARD RICE MAKING A NEGLIGENT INSPECTION, 
THERE IS GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. 
The immunity preserved by § 63-30-10(d) extends to the 
following, under the terms of the statute: 
(1) Immunity for injuries arising out of failure to 
make an inspection; 
(2) Immunity for injuries by reason of making an 
inadequate inspection; and 
(3) Immunity for injuries by reason of making a 
negligent inspection of any property. 
Plaintiff's complaint asserted that Mr. Rice was negligent 
in his inspection, and the jury found that his negligence was 50% 
at fault in proximately causing the accident. 
A quick reading of subsection (d) might give the impression 
it applies only where the injury itself is caused by a dangerous 
condition not revealed through inspection. This is not true. If 
the legislature had meant to limit subsection (d) to injuries 
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from an inadequate inspection, the legislature would not have 
added the additional language preserving immunity for injuries 
arising from a negligent inspection. 
It is a basic rule of statutory construction that all words 
in a statute were placed there purposefully and should be given 
effect. 
As stated in 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 250: 
In the interpretation of a statute, the 
legislature will be presumed to have 
inserted every part thereof for a purpose. 
Thus, it should not be presumed that any 
provision of a statute is redundant. A 
statute should not be construed in such 
manner as to render it partly ineffective or 
inefficient if another construction will 
make it effective. Indeed it is a cardinal 
rule of statutory construction that signifi-
cance and effect should, if possible without 
destroying the sense or effect of the law, 
be accorded to every part of the act, 
including every section, paragraph, sentence 
or clause, phrase, and word. 
This general rule of statutory construction is followed in 
Utah. In Metropolitan Water Dist. of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
City. 380 P.2d 721 (Utah 1963), the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
A well recognized rule of statutory 
construction requires the court to assume 
that all words in a statute were placed 
there advisedly and that all should be given 
meaning wherever possible. 
Id. at 724. Accord, Purfee v. Board of Education of Wayne County 
School Dist. . 604 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1979); and 111 Re 
Rickenbach's Estate, 186 P.2d 973, 974 (Utah 1947). 
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Both the "inadequate" and "negligent inspection" wordings 
should be construed to have separate and distinct meanings: The 
"inadequate" language applies in cases where injury or damage 
occurred subsequent to a superficial inspection, while the 
"negligent" language applies in cases where injury or damage 
resulted from breaching a standard of care in the course of the 
inspection itself, as in this case. 
As stated in Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934 
(Utah 1980): 
It is to be observed, moreover, that 
statutory enactments are to be so construed 
as to render all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful, and that interpretations are to 
be avoided which render some part of a 
provision nonsensical or absurd. 
Id. at 936. 
Cases from other state and federal jurisdictions support 
this rule of statutory construction. 
In City and County of San Francisco v. Farrell. 648 P.2d 935 
(Cal. 1982) , the California Supreme Court stated: 
In construing the words of a statute or 
constitutional provision to discern its 
purpose, the provisions should be read 
together; and interpretation which would 
render terms surplusage should be avoided, 
and every word should be given some signifi-
cance, leaving no part useless or devoid of 
meaning. 
Id. at 938 (citations omitted). Accord, Cox v. Helenius, 693 
P.2d 683, 686 (Wash. 1985); Thompson v. Wyoming Instream Flow 
Comm.. 651 P.2d 778, 787 (Wyo. 1982). 
Also, in Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co., 704 F.2d 
347 (7th Cir. 1983) , the court cited from several other circuits 
in stating the following: 
As a general rule, a court should not 
construe a statute in a way that makes words 
or phrases meaningless, redundant, or 
superfluous. 
Id. at 353 (citations omitted). Accord, United States v. Handy, 
761 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1985); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
American Guarantee Life Ins., 722 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1984). 
POINT III, 
IMMUNITY IN THIS CASE WILL FURTHER THE 
OBVIOUS LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF PROTECTING 
AND ENCOURAGING INSPECTIONS FOR THE BENEFIT 
OF ALL CITIZENS. 
The obvious point of the immunity protection given by § 63-
30-10(d) is to promote inspections in connection with govern-
mental activities, by freeing those performing the inspections 
from the threat of tort liability arising from the inspection 
activity. The goal of promoting and encouraging inspection has 
a clear public policy value in providing all citizens optimum 
goods and services in governmental areas. This public policy is 
clearly present from the facts in this case: 
(1) Mr. Rice was acting in the course and scope of his 
official duties as an inspector, and he was acting in furtherance 
of the details of his inspection when he attempted to raise the 
overhead door, leading to the accident. His specific conduct 
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which led to the accident was not incidental to the inspection. 
It was at the very core of the inspection activity. 
(2) If this inspection activity should incur tort liability 
on Salt Lake City, the next time a similar situation arises, the 
temptation will be to avoid an inspection or perform a more 
limited inspection, so as to minimize the chance of "doing some-
thing wrong" and incurring a tort claim. Thorough inspections by 
government employees should be encouraged. It was a direct 
result of the thoroughness of Mr. Rice's inspection that he chose 
to try to raise the overhead door slightly to better examine the 
plastic seal on the bottom of the door. 
(3) This inspection was being conducted to punch list the 
work of a private contractor on a government job. The inspection 
was part of the procedure to try to insure that the government, 
and therefore the people, get what they pay for in government 
contracts. The clear meaning in the statute gives effect to this 
purpose. A constricted interpretation which would chill this 
governmental activity should be rejected. 
(4) Plaintiff James Ericksen was an employee of the general 
contractor whose work was being inspected. Mr. Ericksen was 
fully entitled to workers compensation benefits for his claim of 
injury. The cost of premiums for workers compensation insurance 
to protect employees such as Mr. Ericksen, was one of the 
overhead items that Projects Unlimited should have had in mind 
when it negotiated its contract with the Airport Authority. By 
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enforcing the rule of governmental immunity in this case, this 
court will not be leaving plaintiff James Ericksen without any 
remedy• 
This Court interprets statutes in the way that will "best 
promote the protection of the public." Clover v. Snowbird Ski 
Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991); Curtis v. Harmon Elec., 
Inc. . 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978). The best promotion of 
protection to the Utah public is to encourage thorough 
inspections to disclose defects and inadequate workmanship and 
correct them. Many aspects of inspection, especially on 
construction projects, involve aspects of the soundness of the 
construction directly related to safety of those who will use the 
facilities. Likewise, all citizens are affected by the cost of 
liability claims caused by construction defects undetected by 
inspection. An incidental cost of the inspection process is the 
possibility that the presence of inspectors at the location of 
the work will result in accidents such as this one. However, in 
the overall view, the safety interest and the economic interest 
of citizens is best served by promoting thorough inspections and 
protecting government entities from liability claims incident to 
the inspection process. 
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POINT IV. 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED'S INDEMNITY AGREEMENT TO 
SALT LAKE CITY IS COMPREHENSIVE AND SHOULD 
BE ENFORCED UNDER THE STANDARDS OF UTAH LAW. 
Article 15 of the construction contract between Projects 
Unlimited and the City reads as follows: 
ARTICLE 15. LIABILITY. The Contractor 
agrees to at all times protect, indemnify, 
save harmless and defend the City, its 
agents and employees from any and all 
claims, demands, judgments, expenses, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, and 
all other damages of every kind and nature 
made, rendered or incurred by or in behalf 
of any person or persons whomsoever, 
including the parties hereto and their 
employees, which may arise out of any act or 
failure to act, work or other activity 
related in any way to the project, by the 
said Contractor, its agents, subcontractors, 
materialmen or employees in the performance 
and execution of this Agreement. 
(R. 122). 
This indemnity agreement is comprehensive and should be 
enforced. Article 15 says nothing about limiting recovery to 
percentage of fault of the contractor. Article 15 says that if 
the accident arose out of the work of Projects Unlimited, then 
Projects Unlimited will indemnify in full and defend the City. 
The interpretation of a written contract may be a question 
of law for resolution by the court. L.D.S. Hospital v. Capitol 
Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988); Buehner Block Co. 
v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
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Utah law is well settled that agreements stated this clearly 
and comprehensively should be enforced. Shell Oil Co, v. 
Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co. . 658 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 1983); 
Freund v. Utah Power & Light Company, 793 P.2d 362, 368 (Utah 
1990). 
In the Freund case, which is Utah's most recent and 
authoritative statement of the law, a unanimous Court enforced 
against the employer an indemnity agreement substantially similar 
to the one in the instant case. 793 P.2d at 371. 
The Court also held that it is entirely appropriate to 
evaluate the indemnification agreement according to the 
objectives of the parties and the surrounding facts and 
circumstances. In the instant case, Projects Unlimited was a 
large general contractor experienced in negotiating at arms' 
length. This agreement was reached between two sophisticated 
business entities. The City knew that as general contractor, 
Projects Unlimited would have control of day-to-day operations on 
the work site. This would necessarily include control of 
conditions affecting safety. It was entirely reasonable for the 
City to require as a condition of the contract that Projects 
Unlimited indemnify the City for any and all claims arising from 
this work.1 
1
 The language in Article 15 of the agreement which holds 
Projects Unlimited responsible for liability "which may arise out 
of any act or failure to act, work or other activity related in any 
way to the project, by the said contractor" is similar to other 
17 
contract language which courts have interpreted to find the 
contractor liable for indemnity for injury to employees of the 
contractor working on the owner's property, occasioned by acts of 
the owner's employees. Annotation, Building contractor's 
liability, upon bond or other agreement to indemnify owner, for 
injury or death of third persons resulting from owner's negligence. 
28 A.L.R.3d 663 (1969), especially § 19(b), which discusses cases 
in which indemnity to the owner was upheld for injury to the 
contractor's employees resulting from negligence by the owner. 
In the following cases, based on the express indemnity 
language in the written agreement between the owner and the 
contractor, the court required the contractor to indemnify the 
owner for injury to an employee of the contractor occasioned by 
activity of the owner's employees on the owner's premises where the 
contractor was performing its work. 
In Newberg Constr. Co. v. Fischbach. Moore & Morrissey. Inc.. 
196 N.E.2d 513 (111. App. 1964) , the court held the contractor 
liable under an agreement to indemnify for claims "caused by, 
resulting from, arising out of, or occurring in connection with the 
execution of the work." 
In Buffa v. General Motors Corp., 131 F. Supp. 478 (D.C. Mich. 
1955), the court held the construction contractor liable for 
indemnity to the owner for injury to persons "on or in connection 
with the work." The court stated that it was only natural that the 
owner should demand protection even from the consequences of its 
own acts in carrying on its usual business, where the contractor 
was using and controlling its own workers on the owner's premises. 
In St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Kopp. 121 N.E.2d 23 (Ohio 
App. 1954), the court held the contractor liable for indemnity 
under contract language extending to injury "growing out of or in 
any way connected with the performance of the work awarded to 
Contractor." 
In Crews Well Service v. Texas Co., 358 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App. 
1962), the court required the contractor to indemnify the owner 
under a contract extending to claims "arising out of or in 
connection with the performance of said work." 
In Alamo Lumber Co. v. Warren Petroleum Corp.. 316 F.2d 287 
(5th Cir. 1963), the court applied Texas law to affirm indemnity to 
the owner under an agreement providing indemnity for damages "which 
arises out of or in connection with the activities of contractor, 
contractor's servants, agents and employees." 
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Freund requires that the breadth of the language employed 
should manifest a conscious effort by the parties to express 
their intent to indemnify. The Freund opinion noted that the use 
in that case of terms such as "full and complete" indemnification 
were significant. 793 P.2d at 371-72. Likewise in the instant 
case, Article 15 uses the broadest language possible. 
The Freund opinion required indemnity despite noting that 
the contract language did not specifically mention the effect of 
any negligence on the part of the licensor/indemnitee, Utah Power 
& Light. 793 P.2d at 371. Likewise in this case, the agreement 
does not specifically mention the effect of any negligence on the 
part of the City. However, in both the Freund case and in the 
instant case, the language broadly covers any and all liabilities 
which may arise out of the work which is the subject of the 
agreement. 
In Reynolds Metals Co. v. J. U. Schickli & Bros., Inc., 548 
S.W.2d 841 (Ky. 1977), the court affirmed indemnity for "any 
liability or damages arising out of or resulting from contractor's 
presence or presence of contractor's employees on owner's 
premises." 
In Rovnak v. Union Carbide Corp., 407 N.Y.S.2d 323 (N.Y. App. 
1978), the court affirmed indemnity from the contractor to the 
owner under an agreement covering "any injuries sustained by 
contractor's employees on the work site." 
In Richmond v. Amoco Production Co. . 390 F. Supp. 673 (D.C. 
Tex. 1975), the court required the contractor to indemnify the 
owner under an agreement covering injuries "incident to or arising 
out of, the performance of this contract." 
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The indemnity agreement by Projects Unlimited is more 
favorable toward indemnity than the agreement applied in the 
Freund decision in one significant aspect: The indemnity 
agreement by Projects Unlimited expressly extends to claims made 
by employees of the parties, including of course employees of 
Projects Unlimited, which was the status of James Ericksen. Thus 
the indemnity agreement in this case expressly includes claims 
such as the one at issue in this case. Likewise in the Shell v. 
Brinkerhoff case, the indemnity agreement expressly extended to 
employees of Brinkerhoff, the contractor/indemnitor, and this 
circumstance was important to the court in allowing Shell the 
opportunity to prove indemnity in that case. Shell Oil Co. v. 
Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co. . 658 P.2d 1187, 1190 (Utah 1983). 
This is not a case where Salt Lake City seeks indemnity for 
its "sole negligence". The agreement imposes no such limitation. 
Further, the jury verdict at trial was that the accident was 
caused by negligence of Projects Unlimited employee Ericksen 
(10%); negligence of Projects Unlimited employees other than 
Ericksen (40%) ; and negligence of Salt Lake City during the 
inspection (50%). Any rule disfavoring indemnity for the sole 
negligence of the indemnitee is simply not applicable, cf. Utah 
Code Ann. § 13-8-1 (declaring such "sole negligence" indemnity 
provisions in construction contracts to be void and 
unenforceable) . This distinction was made in the Shell v. 
Brinkerhoff opinion, 658 P.2d at 1190 n. 2. 
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CONCLUSION 
Governmental immunity for inspections benefits all citizens 
who pay for or use public goods and services. The Court should 
reverse the denial of summary judgment to Salt Lake City and Salt 
Lake Airport Authority against Ericksen. 
The written agreement requires Projects Unlimited to 
indemnify Salt Lake City for all claims which may arise out of 
Projects Unlimited's work or other activity related in any way to 
the project. The Court should reverse the summary judgment in 
favor of Projects Unlimited and the denial of Salt Lake City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment against Projects Unlimited, and 
remand to the district court for entry of judgment for litigation 
expenses against Projects Unlimited. 
If the Court grants Ericksen judgment on his cross-appeal 
for damages against Salt Lake City in amounts attributable to the 
negligence of Projects Unlimited, then the Court should hold that 
the agreement requires Projects Unlimited to indemnify for those 
amounts. 
DATED this 23rd day of October, 1991. 
STRONG & HANNT>--^ 
^Roger ^ H^ JBtillock 
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For . 
Ptarytrrx Kin. ^ F > A - »S3 - 3 
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of the ^ day of 
A P R H , 19 S£> by and between SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a 
municipal corporation of the State of Utah, (hereinafter "CITY") and 
(hereinafter ,fC0NTRACTORn) whose address is: 5Q?. i^-^rr FT-4oo^br>orrw 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the City intends to have completed and Contractor agrees to per-
form the work as set forth in the contract documents (hereinafter the 
work or the project) for Project No. 19-A-153-3, Airport Maintenance 
Facilities, Phase II; and 
WHEREAS, the contractor for the sum and under terms and conditions herein 
stated agrees to perform the work. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the City and the Contractor for the consideration herein-
after provided, agree as follows: 
ARTICLE 1. SCOPE OF WORK. The Contractor agrees to furnish all labor, 
materials and equipment to complete the said work as required in the draw-
ings and specifications which are hereby made a part of this' contract by 
reference. It is understood and agreed by the parties hereto that all 
work shall be performed as required in the drawings and specifications 
and shall be subject to inspection and approval of the City or its author-
ized representative. The relationship of the Contractor to the City here-
under is that of an independent contractor. 
ARTICLE 2. TIME OF COMPLETION. The work under this Contract shall be 
commenced upon Notice to Proceed and shall be completed in accordance with the 
Contract Schedule and Liquidated Damages, page P-3. 
ARTICLE 3. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. Time is the essence of this Contract. The 
Contractor agrees that for each and every day any portion of the work remains 
incomplete after the time herein fixed by the City or within such additional 
time as may have been allowed by written extension, the City shall deduct and 
retain out of the money which may be due or become due said Contractor, or 
Contractor shall pay to the City, the sum or sums indicated in the Contract 
Schedule and Liquidated Damages, page P-3, for each and every calendar day the 
work remains incomplete after the date fixed therein for completion. Said sum 
is, in view of the difficulty of determining City's damages, hereby agreed 
upon, fixed and determined by the parties hereto as liquidated compensatory 
damages that the City will suffer by reason of the failure of the Contractor 
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to coirplete the work within the time agreed uponf and such daily compensation 
shall apply to each portion of said work after the time herein agreed upon for 
its completion• 
Permitting the Contractor to continue and finish the work or any part of 
it after the time fixed for its completion or after the date to which the 
time for completion may have been extended, shall in no way operate as a 
waiver on the part of the City of any of its rights under this Agreement, 
ARTICLE 4. CONTRACT SUM. The City agrees to pay and the Contractor agrees to 
accept for full performance of this Contract, the sum bid by the Contractor in 
his Proposal (page P-l) • The contract sum also includes the cost of all 
bonds, insurance, permits and fees required herein and all charges, expenses 
or assessments of whatever kind or character. No claim for services furnished 
by the Contractor not specifically provided for herein shall be honored by 
City. 
ARTICLE 5. PAYMENT. The City agrees to pay the Contractor from time to 
time as the work progresses, but not more than once each month after date 
of Notice to Proceed, and only upon written certification by the Engineer. 
Within 30 calendar days of the time the Deputy Director approves any partial 
payment, the City will prepare a check for payment. 
ARTICLE 6. PAYMENT FOR MATERIALS ON HAND. There shall be no paynent for 
stored materials. Payment for materials shall be made only after the 
materials are incorporated into the project. 
ARTICLE 7. SALES TAXES. The City is exempt from sales taxes on property 
sold directly to it. Therefore, the City reserves the right for any equip-
ment or materials (exceeding $500 in value) to be ordered by the Contractor 
for use hereunder, to require that the City be billed directly by the 
supplier, after issuance of a City purchase order, at the Contractor's net 
cost less any applicable discounts. The City cost for such equipment or 
material less an amount equal to the sales tax which would otherwise be ap-
plicable, if any, shall be deducted from sums due the Contractor hereunder. 
ARTICLE 8. INDEBTEDNESS. Before final payment is made, the Contractor 
must submit evidence satisfactory to the City that all payrolls, material 
bills, subcontracts and all outstanding indebtedness in connection with the 
work have been paid or that arrangements have been made for their payment. 
Payment will be made without unnecessary delay after receipt of such evi-
dence as mentioned above and final acceptance of the work by the City. 
ARTICLE 9. SCHEDULE OF WAGES. Deleted. 
ARTICLE 10. ADDITIONAL WORK. It is understood and agreed by the parties 
hereto that no money will be paid to the Contractor for any new or addi-
tional labor or materials furnished, as defined in Section GP 6.02, unless 
a new contract or a modification hereof for such additional materials or 
labor has been made in writing and executed by the City and Contractor. 
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The City specifically reserves the right to modify or amend this Contract 
and the total sum due hereunder, either by enlarging or restricting the 
scope of the work. 
ARTICLE 11. ACCEPTANCE. The- Vvork will be inspected for acceptance by 
the Engineer within a reasonable time upon receipt of notice from
 vthe 
Contractor that the work is complete and ready for inspection. 
ARTICLE 12. DISPUTES. 
a. Except as otherwise provided in this Contractf any dispute con-
cerning a question of fact arising under this Contract, which is 
not disposed of by written agreement shall be decided by the Director 
of Airports, who shall reduce his decision to writing, and nail or 
otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. The decision 
of said* Director shall be final and conclusive unless
 f within 30 
days from the date of receipt of such copy, the Contractor mails 
or otherwise furnishes to said Director a written appeal. The 
decision of the Director or his duly authorized representa-
tive for the determination of such appeals, shall be final and 
conclusive. This provision shall not be pleaded in any suit in-
volving a question of fact arising under this Contract as limit-
ing juducial review of any such decision to cases where fraud by 
such official or his representative is alleged. Provided, how-
ever, that any such decision shall be final and conclusive unless 
the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so .grossly 
erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith or is not supported 
by substantial evidence. In connection with any appeal proceed-
ing under this clause, the Contractor shall be afforded an oppor-
tunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of the appeal. 
Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall 
proceed diligently with the performance of the Contract and in ac-
cordance with the Director's decision. 
b. This dispute clause does not preclude consideration of questions 
of law in connection with decisions provided for in Paragraph 
(a) above. However, nothing in this Contract shall be construed 
as making final the decision of the Director or his representative 
on a question of law. 
ARTICLE 13. DEFAULT AND REMEDY. 
a. If the Contractor shall be adjudged bankrupt or make a general 
assignment for the benefits of creditors or if a receiver should 
be appointed on account of insolvency, or if the Contractor or 
any of his Subcontractors should violate any of the provisions 
of this Contract, the City may serve written notice upon the 
Contractor and the bonding company of its intention to terminate 
all or any part of the Contract; and unless within 10 days after 
the serving of such notice, such violation shall be corrected or 
cease, to the City's satisfaction, the City then may take over 
the work $nd prosecute it to completion by Contract or by any 
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other method it may deem advisable and at the expense of the Con-
tractor* The Contractor and the bonding company shall be liable 
to the City for any excess cost occasioned * the City thereby. 
b. Waiver of any default shall not be deemed to be a waives of any 
subsequent default. Waiver of breach of any provision of this 
Agreement shall not be construed to be irodification of the terms 
of this Agreement, unless stated to be such in writing, signed 
by the City* 
c. The Contractor shall continue the performance of this Agreement 
to the extent not cancelled under the provisions of this clause. 
d. The rights and remedies of the City provided in this clause 
shall not be exclusive and are in addition to any other rights 
and remedies provided by law or under this Agreement. 
ARTICLE 14. CITY'S RIGHT TO WITHHOLD CERTAIN AMOUNTS AND MAKE APPLICATION 
THEREOF. 'The City may withhold from payment to the Contractor such an 
amount or amounts asf in its judgmentf may be necessary to pay just claims 
against the Contractor or any Subcontractor for damages, labor and services 
rendered and materials furnished in and about the work. The City may apply 
any such withheld amounts on the payment of such claims in its discretion. 
In so doing, the City shall be deemed the agent of the Contractor and pay-
ments so made by the City shall be considered as a payment made under the 
Contract by the City to the Contractor and the City shall not be liable to 
the Contractor for any such payments made in good faith. 
ARTICLE 15. LIABILITY. The Contractor agrees to at all times protect, 
indemnify, save hamless and defend the City, its agents and enployees from 
any and all claims, demands, judgments, expenses, inclduing reasonable 
attorney's feesr and all other damages of every kind and nature made, ren-
dered or incurred by or in behalf of any person or persons whomsoever, in-
cluding the parties hereto and their employees, which may arise out of any 
act or failure to act, work or other activity related in any way to the 
project, by the said Contractor, its agentsf subcontractors, materialmen 
or employees in the performance and execution of this Agreement. 
ARTICLE 16. SUBCONTRACTOR OR SUPPLIER. No part of this Contract shall 
be sublet by the Contractor without the prior written approval of the City. 
The Contractor and the City for themselves, their heirs, successors, ex-
ecutors, and administrators, hereby agree to the full performance of the 
covenants herein contained. The Contractor also agrees to require in any 
subcontract it makes in connection herewith that the subcontractor shall 
be subject to all of the provisions and requirements of this Contract. 
ARTICLE 17. CONTRACT DOCUMENTS. This Agreement consists of the docu-
irents listed under Section 1.06" of the General Provisions attached, all 
of which are made a part hereof and none of which can be altered, except 
in writing signed' by both parti.es. 
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ARTICLE 18. RIGHTS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, The right is reserved to the 
owners of public utilities and franchises to enter upon the street or work-
site for the purpose of making repairs or changes of their property that 
may become necessary by the work. The City shall also have the privilege 
of entering upon the street or worksite for the purpose of repairing sewers, 
or making house-drain connections therewith, or repairing culverts, storm 
drains, water system repairs or adjustments and any and all other necessary 
city work, 
ARTICLE 19. CONTROLLING LAW. This Agreement shall be construed in accor-
ance with and enforced under the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the day 
and year first above written. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
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CITY' ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake) 
On the day of , 19 , personally appeared 
before me and , 
vfao being by me duly sworn, did say that they are the MAYOR and CITY 
RECORDER, respectively, of SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION," and said persons 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC, residing in 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
ACKNOWLECOENT FOR CORPORATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
County of S a l t Lake) 
On the *Q d a y of A P R i i_ / 19££y personal ly appeared 
before me P M I L f-/oC^rrPTT(?g _ ' w t l ° being by me duly sworn, 
did say tha t he i s t h e y/,r - "PSA^M o c r x r r of ^GDK&rTS t )hJi , A^CTFin 
, and t h a t the fofegomg instrument was 
signed in behalf of s a i d corpora t ion by au tho r i t y of r . n ^ p ^ ^ C T ^ 
"fiv/ \ / s i o ^ ; and said P M I < ^ I r r ^ 
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My Commission Expi res : 
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BRUCE T. JONES, ESQ. (#17 32) 
CHARLES P. SAMPSON, ESQ. (#4658) 
of and for 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
FWL£BDIST2!£T5»»J2T 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 0 8 1991 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES D. ERICKSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
and SALT LAKE AIRPORT 
AUTHORITY, 
Defendants. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C88-637 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Third-Party Defendant Projects Unlimited, Inc. ("Pro-
jects"), brought a Motion for Summary Judgment on the Third-Party 
Complaint of Salt .Lake City Corporation against Projects, request-
ing that the Court grant judgment in favor of Projects. Salt 
Lake City Corporation brought a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Projects. 
Projects moved the Court on the grounds that the ex-
press language of the construction Agreement dated April 9, 1986, 
between the parties, and in particular ARTICLE 15 contained 
therein respecting indemnification, does not extend to allega-
tions of Salt Lake City's own negligence. Pursuant to Utah's 
Comparative Negligence provisions, the plaintiff can only recover 
from Salt Lake City in this action the amount of damages equiva-
lent to the proportion of fault attributable to Salt Lake City.l 
As a consequence of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act,2 where 
the plaintiff has brought an action alleging negligence by Salt 
Lake City in a job-related injury, the potential liability of 
Projects (the former employer of plaintiff at the time of the 
injury) to Salt Lake City, if any, can only arise from a contract 
of indemnification wherein Projects clearly and unequivocally 
agrees to indemnify Salt Lake City from Salt Lake City's own 
negligence. Salt Lake City, and indirectly the plaintiff, cannot 
recover from Projects except where Projects has clearly and 
unequivocally waived the bar afforded Projects by the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. Salt Lake City cannot here maintain a third-
party action against Projects because there is no clear and 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-40 (1986), as amended. 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1953), as amended. 
- 2 -
unequivocal indemnification expressed in the Agreement between 
the parties whereby Projects indemnifies or agrees to defend 
Salt Lake City from Salt Lake City's own negligence. 
The Court having reviewed the Memorandum filed by the 
parties, considered the admissible evidence proffered by the 
parties, and heard the oral arguments of counsel at a hearing 
held on March 4, 1991, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment of Third-Party 
Defendant Projects Unlimited, Inc. is granted, thereby dismissing 
the Third-Party Complaint of Salt Lake City with prejudice. 
The causes of action alleged in the Third-Party Complaint are 
barred by Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-60 (1953), as amended, there being no clear and unequivocal 
waiver of the bar expressed in the construction Agreement between 
the parties requiring Projects to indemnify or defend Salt Lake 
City from or against allegations of Salt Lake City's own negli-
gence . 
2. The Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment of Salt 
Lake City Corporation is denied. 
3. That judgment be, and hereby is, entered in favor 
of Third-Party Defendant Projects and against Third-Party Plain-
tiff Salt Lake City Corporation. 
- 3 -
/ i t »• ' Z<\ 
DATED this % ~~ day of March, 1991 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE KENNETH R^GTRUP 
f'V > SVC/ )'///7(/V 
v ' J' j-Sf CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this (^ day of March, 1991, to: 
Roger H. Bullock, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ned P. Siegfried, Esq. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
310 East 4500 South, #620 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
BTJ1I.10 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
JAMES D. ERICKSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
and SALT LAKE AIRPORT AUTHORITY 
9l\*o45 \1 




Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
oooOooo 
This action came on regularly for trial on the 5th day of 
March, 1991 in Department 4 of the above entitled Court, the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge presiding; 
That said parties appeared by their attorneys, John Farrell 
Fay, Counsel for Plaintiff and Roger Bullock, Counsel for 
Defendant. A jury of eight persons was impaneled and sworn. 
Witnesses were sworn and testified. After hearing the evidence and 
arguments of counsel, the jury was duly instructed by the Court and 
the cause was submitted to jury with directions to return a verdict 
em 
on special issues. The jury deliberated and thereafter returned 
into court with its verdict consisting of the special issues 
submitted to the jury and the answers given thereto by the jury, 
which said verdict was in words and figures, as follows, to-wit: 
We, the jury in the above entitled action, find the following 
Special Verdict on the questions submitted to us: 
1. Was Salt Lake City Corporation negligent as forth in these 
instructions? 
Answer: Yes 
2. If so, was Salt Lake City's conduct a proximate cause of 
the accident to plaintiff James Ericksen? 
Answer: Yes 
If you have answered both of the above questions "yes" then 
please go on. If you have answered either of the above questions 
"no" you will not answer the remaining questions but will simply 
sign the verdict. 
That is, if you find that the defendant's conduct was not 
negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident, then simply 
sign the verdict form and inform the bailiff that you are done. On 
the other hand, if you find that the defendant's conduct was 
negligent and a proximate cause of the accident, then go on. 
3. Was plaintiff James Ericksen negligent as set forth in 
these instructions? 
2 
n f \ ' V ***** 
Answer: Yes 
A. If so, was plaintiff James Ericksenfs own conduct a 
proximate cause of the accident? 
Answer: Yes 
5. Was Projects Unlimited negligent as set forth in these 
instructions through the conduct of officers or employees other 
than James Ericksen? 
Answer: Yes 
6. If so, was Projects UnlimitedTs conduct a proximate cause 
of the accident? 
Answer; Yes 
7. Based upon a total percentage of 100%, set forth in the 
spaces below the percentage of negligence which proximately caused 
the accident which is attributable to each of the following. You 
should attribute percentages only to those parties which you have 
found guilty of negligence which proximately caused the accident in 
response to questions 1 through 6 above. 
Plaintiff James Ericksen 10% 
Defendant Salt Lake City 50% 
Projects Unlimited Inc. 40% 
TOTAL MUST BE 100% 
Note: If you attribute 50% or more of the negligence to 
plaintiff James Ericksen, you need not answer any further question. 
3 
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If you attribute less than 50% of the negligence to plaintiff James 
Ericksen, then answer the following questions: 
8. What amount of damages, if any, do you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff sustained as a 
proximate result of the accident of March 5, 1987? 
Past medical expenses: $3,300.00 
Past lost wages: 7,900.00 
Future medical expenses, 
future lost earnings, pain, 
suffering, and other future 
damage s: 175,000.00 
TOTAL: $186,200.00 
Dated this 7th day of March 1991. 
Karen Emerson 
Foreperson 
It appearing that by reason of said special verdict: 
That Plaintiff James D. Ericksen is entitled to Judgement in 
the amount of *7*f ffiZ — » This represents $5,600.00 in special 
damages plus interest at 8% for 4 years and general damages in the 
amount of $87,500.00. 
W *• >* %# \ 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
That Plaintiff James D. Ericksen recover costs and disbursements 
taxes in the sum of * biZ. 
\4- I. 
Dated: Mul'dli 12-, 1991 
JUHGE ^ OF THE DISjRiqJp "COURT 
Judgement is hereby entered in favor of the Plaintiff against 
the Defendants in Third District Court in the County of Salt Lake, 
Book no. , on page no. , on , 1991. 
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